

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 2638

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BYROADE

E.O. 61652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, IR

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SHAH OF IRAN AND PM BHUTTO
DURING THE SHAH'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN

1. WHEN THE BHUTTOS WERE AT OUR RESIDENCE RECENTLY (ISLAMABAD 2342) HE INVITED US TO HIS HOME AT LARKANA WHEN THE SHAHANSHAH AND SHAHBANOU WOULD BE THERE FOR THE LAST TWO DAYS OF THEIR VISIT TO PAKISTAN. PRIOR TO GOING TO LARKANA (MARCH 10-11) MRS. BYRODE AND I ATTENDED A RECEPTION ON MARCH 8 GIVEN BY BHUTTO IN

HONOR OF THE SHAH. AT THE RECEPTION BHUTTO ASKED ME TO JOIN AN ONGOING CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIM AND THE SHAH, THE PAK ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE PAK AIR CHIEF MARSHAL AT LARKANA, SCHEDULES WERE OF COURSE CROWDED BUT I DID HAVE SOME THIRTY MINUTES ALONE WITH BHUTTO AND IN THE COCKTAIL PERIOD BEFORE DINNER HE ASKED THAT I JOIN HIM AND THE SHAH AND THEN WALKED AWAY LEAVING ME AND THE SHAH ALONE FOR QUITE SOME TIME. ALL OF THESE TALKS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION REPORTED BELOW, WERE EXCLUSIVELY ON THE MILITARY NEEDS OF PAKISTAN. WHILE FOR THE MOST PART THEY COVERED GENERALITIES, THE FOLLOWING SEEMS WORTHY OF YOUR ATTENTION.

2. THE SHAH, IN THE PRESENCE OF BHUTTO AND HIS SERVICE CHIEFS (AND LATER ON WITH ME ALONE) ADDRESSED HIMSELF DIRECTLY TO ME ON THE IMPORTANCE, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF IRAN, OF AN ADEQUATE
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DEFENSE POSTURE ON THE PART OF PAKISTAN. HE SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS

THAT THE ALREADY UNACCEPTABLE DISPARITY OF STRENGTH BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WAS GROWING GREATER ALL THE TIME AT THE EXPENSE OF PAKISTAN. HE SAID HIS READING WAS THAT THE SITUATION IN THE PAK AIR FORCE WAS GETTING "IMPOSSIBLE." (LATER WHEN WE WERE ALONE AT LARKANA HE GAVE ME FROM MEMORY A DETAILED RUNDOWN OF THE EQUIPMENT STATUS IN THE AIR FORCE SAYING ITS TYPE AND CONDITION EFFECTIVELY LEFT THEM WITH "NOTHING-JUST NOTHING.") HE ASKED WHEN I THOUGHT WE MIGHT MAKE THE DECISION ON SALE OF A NEW GENERATION AIRCRAFT FOR PAKISTAN. I SAID WE HAD JUST AGREED TO RECEIVE A PAK EVALUATION TEAM THAT WERE GOING TO THE U.S. TO EVALUATE TWO OR THREE OF OUR AIRCRAFT TO SEE WHICH WOULD BEST MEET THEIR NEEDS. AFTER THIS SURVEY, WITH THE FOLLOWING PAK DECISION AS TO WHAT TO GO FOR, I FELT CERTAIN THE MATTER WOULD RECEIVE HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON. I SAID I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE HIM SPECIFICS AS REGARDS THE TIMING ON SUCH CONSIDERATION ON OUR PART. I DID TELL HIM HOWEVER THAT I FULLY AGREED THAT THE NEEDS OF THE PAK AIR FORCE WERE REAL, AND THAT I FELT THIS WAS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD BY OUR HIGHER LEVELS AT HOME.

3. WHEN ALONE WITH THE SHAH AND PREVIOUSLY WITH BHUTTO, THE TOPIC OF INDIAN ACTION AND REACTION ON AN ITEM SUCH AS AIRCRAFT CAME UP, AS IT OF COURSE ALWAYS DOES. THEY BOTH SEPARATELY TOOK SO MUCH THE SAME POSITION THAT I WAS LEFT WITH THE THOUGHT THAT IT MUST HAVE BEEN GERMINATED BY THE PREVIOUS TALKS BETWEEN THEM. THE SHAH WAS AS STRONG AS BHUTTO THAT IT WAS WRONG TO LET THE INDIAN ASPECT BE DOMINANT IN OUR THINKING. THE SHAH SAID THAT IN HIS EYES PAKISTAN HAD A POSITION OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE FAR GREATER THAN JUST IN A PAK-INDIAN CONTEXT. HE DEVELOPED AT SOME LENGTH HIS FAMILIAR THEME OF SOVIET INTENTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD THE WARM WATERS AND RESOURCES OF THE GULF AREA, RAISING WHERE THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY LEAVE IMPORTANT CENTERS OF STRENGTH SUCH AS EUROPE, JAPAN, ETC. HE SAID IF PAKISTAN SHOULD BE LOST HE WOULD LITERALLY BE LEFT ALONE, SURROUNDED BY COUNTRIES ALL FAVORABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS NO ACCIDENT THAT IRAN AND PAKISTAN HAD BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AT THE SAME TIME AS HE HAD MENTIONED WARM AND FAVORABLE TIES WITH TURKEY. BHUTTO HAD ALREADY MADE THIS SAME POINT WITH ME.

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4. I TOLD THE SHAH THAT OUR PAK FRIENDS BECAME ANNOYED WITH US AT TIMES FOR TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INDIAN VIEWS. PERHAPS THEY ERRONEOUSLY FELT THAT THEY WERE IN SOME KIND OF POPULARITY CONTEST WITH THE INDIANS AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED. IT WAS JUST A FACT HOWEVER THAT ON OUR SIDE WE WERE FACED WITH POSSIBLE PITFALLS THAT COULD NOT BE SAFELY IGNORED, PARTICULARLY WITH OUR CURRENT SITUATION WITH OUR CONGRESS ON THE WHOLE GENERAL ISSUE OF MILITARY SUPPLY AND SALES TO

OTHERS. I SAID, FOR INSTANCE, ONE COULD SUSPECT, BUT NOT PROVE, THAT THE INDIANS WERE GOING TO GO FOR A NEW GENERATION, DEEP PENETRATION AIRCRAFT OF THEIR OWN REGARDLESS OF WHAT PAKISTAN OR WE DID. IF THIS WERE THE CASE IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR US AT HOME TO GIVE THEM THE LUXURY OF ACCUSING US OF FORCING THEM TO ESCALATE, EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT HAVE DONE IT ANYWAY. WE HAD TO BE CERTAIN THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT GET HURT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BY A CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL. HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD BUT HOPED WE COULD SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO GIVE THE GO-AHEAD ON A NEW AIRCRAFT SOON. HE SAID WITH PAKISTAN'S TWO-BORDER PROBLEM HE THOUGHT THE A-7 BEST FOR THEIR NEEDS, BUT THAT DECISION WAS OF COURSE FOR BHUTTO TO MAKE.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BYROADE

5. THE SHAH SAID THERE WAS ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR WHICH HE HOPED WE WOULD KEEP IN MIND ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTTO WAS DOING WELL AND WHAT A CONTRAST THIS WAS FROM THE WAY PAKISTAN HAD BEEN UNDER MILITARY RULE. BHUTTO, HE SAID, JUST COULD NOT AFFORD TO LET THE MORALE OF HIS MILITARY GO BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL OVER THE ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT OR THE DAY COULD COME WHEN HE COULD BE GONE AND THE MILITARY AGAIN IN CONTROL, WHICH HE SAID "WOULD BE A TRAGEDY." I SAID WE WERE INDEED CONSCIOUS OF THIS VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT AND FULLY AGREED WITH HIM THAT SUCH A CHANGE IN PAKISTAN WOULD MOST CERTAINLY NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST.

6. THE SHAH DID NOT LET ANY FRUSTRATIONS HE MAY HAVE WITH US

SHOW THROUGH. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND EVEN COMPLIMENTARY EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION THAT HE HAS ACCESS TO OUR SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT AND WISHED IT COULD BE THE SAME WAY FOR PAKISTAN.

7. BHUTTO, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS IN A VERY SERIOUS MOOD, AND I THOUGHT A BIT DESPONDENT, ALTHOUGH HE TOLD ME HIS TALKS WITH THE SHAH WERE IN GENERAL GOING WELL. HE TOOK THE SAME LINE AS THE SHAH HAD ABOUT PAKISTAN HAVING A STRATEGIC POSITION ON ITS OWN AND THAT THINGS COULD NOT BE LOOKED AT ONLY IN A PAK-INDIA CONTEXT. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED LONG AGO BY YOU AND PRESIDENT NIXON, BECOMING QUITE SPECIFIC ON QUOTES INCLUDING A NIXON LETTER TO YAHYA KHAN SHORTLY AFTER THE LATTER CAME TO POWER. I SAID IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE FOR HIM TO ASSUME THAT
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YOU FELT ONE BIT DIFFERENT ON THIS THAN YOU DID SOME YEARS AGO AS I KNEW YOUR VIEWS HAD NOT CHANGED. ANY PROBLEMS WE MIGHT HAVE WOULD NOT LIE IN THAT DIRECTION.

8. IN ORDER TO GIVE A NEW DIRECTION TO OUR TALK I TOLD BHUTTO I HAD HEARD A RUMOR THAT VISITING SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FIRYUBIN HAD BEEN PRETTY TOUGH IN HIS TALKS IN PAKISTAN, PARTICULARLY ON THE SUBJECT OF AN ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM. BHUTTO SAID THAT WAS INCORRECT. HE SAID IT WAS HE WHO HAD BEEN TOUGH, ADDING REFLECTIVELY MAYBE TOO MUCH SO IN VIEW OF ALL THE PROBLEMS HE HAS TO FACE AND HIS OWN MILITARY SITUATION. HE SAID THE RUSSIAN HAD TALKED MUCH OF WANTING BETTER RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, OF BEING HELPFUL IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, ETC. BHUTTO SAID HE TOLD HIM FLAT OUT HE DIDN'T SEE HOW HE COULD TALK OF BETTER RELATIONS AT THE SAME TIME THEY WERE ARMING BOTH HIS NEIGHBORS WHO WERE NOT FRIENDLY TO PAKISTAN, AND WOULDN'T EVEN RECOGNIZE SOME OF PAKISTAN'S BORDERS. BHUTTO SAID IT WAS ASKING A BIT MUCH TO EXPECT WARM FRIENDLY RELATIONS COULD BE BOUGHT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS BY HELP WITH A FEW SCHOOL HOUSES, ETC. I ASKED HOW THE RUSSIAN TOOK IT. HE SAID IN TYPICAL RUSSIAN FASHION. HE HAD STARTED TO SAY "BUT I DON'T UNDERSTAND -----". BHUTTO SAID HE INTERRUPTED BY SAYING HE DIDN'T KNOW WHY HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND AS IT ALL SEEMED PERFECTLY CLEAR TO HIM. IT IS NOW OBVIOUS THAT BHUTTO'S WELL PUBLICIZED REMARKS (ISLAMABAD 2448) AT THE DINNER FOR AGA KHAN STRESSING THE NEED FOR RECIPROCITY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE NOT SO MUCH AIMED AT INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN BUT WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF HIS TALK WITH FIRYUBIN. BHUTTO CHOSE THE UNUSUAL OCCASION OF THAT DINNER TO MAKE THEM SO FIRYUBIN WOULD SEE THEM IN THE PRESS WHILE STILL IN PAKISTAN.

9. AS AN EXAMPLE OF BHUTTO'S MOOD, HE SAID IT WAS HARD TO SEE US MOVE FORWARD ON NEW MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AS WITH EGYPT, AND NOT SHOW MORE CONCERN FOR THE PLIGHT OF PAKISTAN. I SAID AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT WOULD BE

FULL OF VERY GREAT PROBLEMS FOR US AS I WAS SURE HE KNEW. HE
REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THEY COULD BE WORKED OUT BEFORE TOO LONG
AS OTHERWISE SADAT MIGHT BE DEAD.

10. I RESISTED THE TEMPTATION OF ASKING EITHER THE SHAH OR
BHUTTO ANYTHING ABOUT THEIR TALKS ON THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF
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FINANCE AS I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THE MOOD OF THAT DISCUSSION HAD
BEEN AND WE WILL KNOW SOON IN ANY EVENT. IT WAS ONLY POSSIBLE
PRIOR TO OUR DEPARTURE TO HAVE A BRIEF WORD ON HOW THE TALKS
WENT WITH ASLAM KHATTAK, PAK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN. HE SAID HE
THOUGHT THE TALKS HAD GONE "PRETTY WELL" AS FAR AS FINANCE WAS
CONCERNED. HE ALSO TOLD ME FOR MY EAR ONLY THAT THEY HAD TALKED
OF REPORTS THAT DAOUD MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY ILL AND WHAT HIS
PASSING MIGHT MEAN FOR THE AREA (WE HAVE HAD NO SUCH REPORT).
KHATTAK ALSO SAID A GREAT DEAL OF TIME HAD BEEN SPENT ON OUR
OWN INTERNAL SITUATION AND OUR CURRENT ABILITY TO CARRY ON A
STRONG FOREIGN POLICY. MAYBE THIS WAS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
BHUTTO'S MOOD. HE WAS ALSO NEAR EXHAUSTION FROM THE RECENT
HECTIC SCHEDULE HE HAS BEEN ON.
BYROADE

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